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INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) long advocated
the view that a party in possession of material, nonpublic information-regardless of the circumstances that lead to that knowledgehas a duty to disclose or abstain from trading.' Applied to corporate
t
B.S., Binghamton University, 2006;J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2009. I am
indebted to Osamu Watanabe for inspiring me to write on this topic. I am grateful to
Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Jonah Fecteau for their insights and guidance. I appreciate my
colleagues on the Cornell Law Review for all their assistance. Most of all, I thank my family
and friends for their love and support.
1 WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 659 (2d ed. 2007). This duty is premised
on the belief that all market participants should have access to the same information, appealing to notions of fairness. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc) ("[A]ll members of the investing public should be subject to identical
market risks" and should "trad[e] on an equal footing" with each other.). The SEC successfully argued for this aptly labeled "equal access theory" in several landmark cases. See
Craig W. Davis, Comment, Misapprqprators,Tippees, and the Intent-to-Benefit Rule: What We
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insiders, this duty is the essence of the classical theory of insider trad3
ing,2 as sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Chiarellav. United States.
An insider, then, must either disclose all material, nonpublic information pertaining to the underlying securities or abstain from trading
altogether. 4 Failure to disclose such information prior to trading exposes that insider to liability under SEC Rule 10b-5. 5 But in a negotiated sale of securities between two sophisticated 6 parties, can the
parties agree not to disclose all material, 7 nonpublic 8 information and
still transact?

Can Still Learn From Cady, Roberts, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 263, 270 (2004) ("In SECv. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., a paradigm insider trading case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit expressly adopted Cady, Roberts' disclose or abstain rule under a theory
of equal access to information."). But the SEC's "triumph of the equal access theory in
Texas Gulf Sulphur was not to abide" since "[i]n Chiarellav. United States, the Supreme Court
took the opportunity to trim back the broad prohibition of Texas Gulf Sulphur by rejecting
the equal access theory" and the "insistence on informational parity and identical market
risks." Id. at 271-72. Currently, the "equal access theor[y] for Section 10(b) objectives [is]
'dead."' Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading Regulation-A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT'L
LAw. 153, 155 (2003).
2 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997) (emphasizing the fiduciary relationship between shareholders and insiders).
3 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
4 See id. at 227 ("[The SEC], and the courts have consistently held that insiders must
disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are
not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investmentjudgment." (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961))); see also
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 n.21 (1983) ("[A]n insider has to observe what has come to
be known as the abstain or disclosure rule. Either the information has to be disclosed to
the market if it is inside information . . . or the insider must abstain." (quoting Transcript
of Oral Argument at 27, Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (No. 82-276))); Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911
(adopting the disclose or abstain rule in an SEC proceeding).
5 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52.
6 This Note uses the SEC's definition of "sophisticated," which is a person who "has
such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment."
17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(b) (2) (ii) (2007). For a good discussion of the factors considered in determining a party's sophistication, see 7CJ. WILLIAM HicKs, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE

SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 § 11.08[2] [b] (1st ed. rev. 1988).
7 In Rule 10b-5 actions, a fact is material if a plaintiff can establish "a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote," taking into account "the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); accord Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988).
8 The distinction between nonpublic and public information is inexact. The SEC
maintains that information is public once it has "been effectively disclosed in a manner
sufficient to insure its availability to the investing public." SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). This Note uses the Texas Gulf Sulphur definition. For a good discussion of what constitutes nonpublic information, see RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M.

§ 2.01[2] (2007).

NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL
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Indeed, such an agreement is the fundamental concept of a big
boy letter. 9 Big boy letters are agreements between parties to a securities transaction where one party, typically the seller, has material, nonpublic information that it does not want to disclose,' 0 but both parties
want to complete the transaction and preclude any claims based on
the nondisclosure."1 Though widely used in securities transactions for
years, 12 the terms of a big boy letter vary, yet standard provisions include representations by the signatory that: it is financially sophisticated; it is aware that the counterparty may have material, nonpublic
information that may affect the value of the traded securities; it realizes that it is not privy to any such information, if there is any; it is not
relying on any of its counterparty's nondisclosures, if there are any; it
is not relying on any representations not expressly set forth in the big
boy letter; it is waiving all claims against its counterparty arising out of
the nondisclosure; and finally, it realizes the effect of this waiver and
elects to proceed with the transaction, essentially stating, "I am a big
boy."1 3
Big boy letters have received much attention in recent months on
account of two cases involving big boy letters and a New York Times
9 See Karl A. Groskaufmanis & Kalman Ochs, RevisitingInsider Trading in the Debt Markets: Lessons for Debt Investors and Members of Committees in Bankruptcy Cases, 8 J. INVESTMENT
COMPLIANCE, No. 4, 2007, at 22, 24 [hereinafter Revisiting Insider Trading] ("Big boy letters
are agreements under which market participants make a business decision to move forward with a transaction with advance knowledge that one party may have undisclosed material information.").
10 There are several reasons why this party (typically the seller) would not want to
disclose the nonpublic information. In many instances, the seller acquired that information pursuant to a confidentiality agreement with a third party, thereby inhibiting the
seller from disclosing the information without violating other duties. Even if the seller
were willing and able to disclose the nonpublic information, the counterparty may be unwilling to accept it, as it may wish to resell the securities without the worry of possessing
nonpublic information. The issue of reselling securities after acquiring them with a big
boy letter is discussed in Part V.A. See Stephen R. Hertz, Do Big-Boy Letters Really Work, 3
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON: THE PRIVATE EQUITy REPORT (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP), No. 3,
Spring 2003, at 5, http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/2736c2ae-9f14-4dee-b653982519a39acl /Presentation/PublicationAttachment/aa1 38944-92c4-4eef-8a6e-d30d0532
e5 1/Spring%202003.pdf.
S1I See Randall W. Bodner et al., Big Boy Letters in the Spotlight, INsIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L.
ADVISOR, June 2007, at 2, 2.
12
See id.; see also Stephen E. Older & Joshua M. Bloomstein, Cutting "BIG BOYS" Down
to Size, MERGERS & ACQuISITIONS: DEALMAKER'SJ., Dec. 2003, at 38, 39 (noting that big boy

letters "have come into increasing use in transactions involving sales of publicly traded
securities, including mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures."); Josh Stoffregen, Big Boy Letters No Shield, Says SEC, COMPLIANCE REPORTER, Nov. 16, 2007, LexisNexis Academic.

13 See Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 2; Revisiting Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 24;
Hertz, supra note 10, at 5; Rachel McTague, In Insider Case, Big Boy Letter Signatory Need Not
Have Been Deceived, Official Says, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1893 (Dec. 10, 2007) [hereinafter McTague, In Insider Case]; Older & Bloomstein, supra note 12, at 38-39. For a form
big boy letter, see THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISORS app. F8 (2007).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:133

article on the topic.' 4 The first case was an SEC enforcement action
against Barclays in May 2007.15 The SEC charged Barclays and its
head proprietary trader of distressed U.S. debt with violating Rule
1Ob-5 by trading securities while in possession of material, nonpublic
information about the corporate issuers.1 6 The trader allegedly obtained this information by participating in various bankruptcy creditors committees. 17 Although the proprietary trader used big boy
letters in several of the transactions,1 8 the SEC still brought an enforcement action. Without admitting or denying any wrongdoing,
Barclays and the proprietary trader agreed to pay a combined $11.69
million to settle the matter.1 9
The second case, R2 Investments LDC v. Salomon Smith Barney, was a
private suit that commenced in April 2001.20 Salomon Smith Barney
(now Smith Barney) had sold more than $20 million of high-yield
World Access bonds toJeffries & Company, an investment bank, using
2
a big boy letter. 21 Jeffries immediately resold those bonds to R , allegedly without informing R 2 that it had signed a big boy letter with Salomon when purchasing the notes. 2 2 A few days after R 2 acquired the
bonds, World Access "disclosed disappointing earnings and other negative financial information." 2 3 Upon this news, the market value of
the bonds plunged by over thirty percent. 24 Six years after R 2 filed the
25
complaint, the parties settled the matter.
In addition to these two cases, big boy letters are an important
issue because they are very common in the financial industry, yet they
occupy a gray area of the law. 26 Corporate attorneys disagree on the
issue. 27 To date, no court has ruled on the enforceability or effect of
14
15
16
17
18

Jenny Anderson, Side Deals in a Gray Area, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at C1.
SEC v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 07-CV-04427 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007).
Complaint
1-7, Barclays Bank, No. 07-CV-04427.

Id.
Id.

18.

19 Barclays Bank Pays $10.9 Million to Settle Charges of Insider Trading on Bankruptcy Creditor Committee Information, Litigation Release No. 20,132 (May 30, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20132.htm.
20 R2 Invs. LDC v. Salomon Smith Barney, No. 01-CV-03598 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2001).
21
Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 4.
22 Id. at 4.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Anderson, supra note 14. The price of the notes dropped to $360 per $1,000 bond,
whereas R2 just recently bought the bonds for $501.875 per $1,000 bond. Id.
25
See Wen Creditors are Traders, Gray Areas Arise, DISTRESSED INVESTING REP. (Turnaround Mgmt. Ass'n, Chicago, Il1.), Apr. 2008, at 16, available at http://www.tumaround.
org/cmaextras/DI-report.FINAL.pdf.
26 See Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 2 ("[R]ecent developments raise anew the longstanding question of whether such 'big boy' letters are enforceable.").
27 See Anderson, supra note 14 (interviewing practitioners at more than a dozen law
firms "elicit[ed] a wide range of opinions on big-boy letters.").
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big boy letters. 28 R2 was the first and only case in the United States
that concerned big boy letters.29 As R2 settled, judicial analysis of big
boy letters is still lacking. In addition, the SEC has never issued any
official guidance on big boy letters.3 0 Finally, discourse on big boy
31
letters is, at best, scant in legal academic literature.
Perhaps most interesting is that, despite the prevalence of big boy
letters and their unresolved legal status, 3 2 / was the only private suit
concerning them. 33 Apparently, big boy letters have the invaluable
effect of preventing costly litigation. The circumstances surrounding
big boy letters reveal an explanation for this phenomenon. Big boy
letters are contracts between sophisticated parties who are repeat players in the financial markets. 34 As such, these parties must act with

integrity to protect their brand and reputation. 35 By signing a big boy
letter, the signatory agrees not to sue its counterparty regarding any
28 Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 5; see also Revisiting Insider Trading, supra note 9, at
24 ("The use of big boy language has evolved with little direct guidance from the
courts .... ").
29 See Anderson, supra note 14, (observing that with the R2 case, "[t]he use of big-boy
letters is about to face its first significant legal challenge"). An analysis of Judge Easterbrook's and judge Posner's opinions in Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., however, reveals that
they would support the enforceability of big boy letters. SeeJordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.,
815 F.2d 429, 436 (1987) (Easterbrook, J.); id. at 445-51 (Posner, J., dissenting); M. Todd
Henderson, DeconstructingDuff and Phelps, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1739, 1754 (2007) ("One
thing upon which Easterbrook and Posner agree is that the parties could, through contract, waive any duties to disclose . .

").

Anderson, supra note 14 ("The Securities and Exchange Commission has not
weighed in on [big boy] letters."). Within the past several months, however, four officials
at the SEC have made public comments regarding big boy letters in the context of an SEC
enforcement action. See Rachel McTague, 'BigBoy'Letter Not a Defense to SEC Insider Trading
Charge, Official Says, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter
McTague, Not a Defense] (reporting remarks of Fredric Firestone, SEC Associate Director);
McTague, In Insider Case, supra note 13, at 1893 (noting reflections of David Rosenfeld,
SEC Associate Regional Director); Stoffregen, supra note 12 (recording analyses by Doug
Scheidt, SEC Associate Director, and Thomas Biolsi, SEC Associate Regional Director).
Although the assertions of individual staff members do not reflect an official position by
the SEC, the statements are notable nonetheless. See infra Part IV for a discussion of big
boy letters and SEC enforcement actions.
31
At the time of publication, in addition to this Note, only two contemporaneous,
independently developed works commenting on big boy letters have been published in
legal academic literature.
32 Wendell H. Adair, Jr. & Brett Lawrence, Big Boy Letters: Playingit Safe After O'Hagan,
J. CORP. RENEWAL, June 1, 2004, availableat http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectlD=3342 ("[T]here is almost no jurisprudence concerning big boy
letters .... ").
33
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
34 These repeat players are almost always institutional investors, including hedge
funds, private equity funds, pension funds, investment banks, insurance companies, and
broker-dealers. See Revisiting Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 24.
35
See AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, THE RoLE OF CORPORATE REPUTATION FOR MULTINATIONAL FIRMs,
at xv (2001). ("The reputation of a firm is central to the success of the
decisions and positions taken by management. It embodies the firm's total organizational
effectiveness. A good reputation is an effective market signal resulting from a firm's suc30
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nondisclosure. Thus, the signatory may not be able to afford the
reputational costs of going back on its word by suing the counterparty.
In the financial industry, trust and reputation are arguably a firm's
36
most valuable assets.

Against this backdrop, it is necessary to take a critical look at this
controversial practice and to examine the legal enforceability of big
boy letters. This Note argues for the enforceability of big boy letters
in negotiated, face-to-face transactions between sophisticated parties.
This Note then argues that even if courts refuse to enforce the waiver
clause of a big boy letter, the big boy letter can still preclude a Rule
10b-5 suit. Part I of this Note provides background on the various
securities laws at play and outlines the rise of big boy letters. Part II
contends that big boy letters should be enforceable despite the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Exchange Act. Part III argues that,
even if big boy letters are void under the anti-waiver provision, there is
still no fraud or deception in a transaction involving big boy letters.
Part III also argues that big boy letters disqualify claims of reasonable
reliance. The absence of either fraud or reasonable reliance would
thereby obviate a Rule 10b-5 allegation. Part IV explores big boy letters in the context of SEC enforcement actions. Part V investigates
several problems produced by big boy letters and discusses potential
answers to those problems.
I
THE EMERGENCE OF BIG

Boy

LETrERS

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorized
the SEC to regulate the use of manipulative3 7 and deceptive devices in
38 Rule 10b-5, 39
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
cessful organizational market effectiveness. Corporate reputation has a crucial role in the
market valuation of the firm .... ").
36
See id; see alsoJordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (1987) ("[A] firm's
desire to preserve its reputation is a powerful inducement to treat its contractual partners
well.").
37
Manipulation is largely a term of art and does not directly apply to insider trading.
The term refers to the artificial control of the price of a security, which is not an issue with
big boy letters. Steven A. Ramirez & Christopher M. Gilbert, The MisappropriationTheory of
Insider Trading Under United States v. O'Hagan: Why Its Bark is Worse Than Its Bite, 26 SEC.
REG. L.J. 162, 164 n.8 (1998).
38
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
39
Rule 10b-5 provides in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

2008]

TRADING ON INSIDE INFORMATION

promulgated under section 10(b), prohibits any fraud or deceit-the
making of untrue statements of material facts or the omission of material facts-in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 40 A
judicially created implied right of action under Rule lOb-5 allows private parties to bring Rule lOb-5 claims. 4 1 Over the years, Rule lOb-5
has developed into the SEC's principal tool to combat insider trading. 42 As the SEC enacted Rule lob-5 pursuant to section 10(b), the
Supreme Court has repeatedly proclaimed that the reach of Rule lOb43
5 cannot exceed that of section 10(b).
The Supreme Court, at first, certified Rule lOb-5 liability for insider trading under the classical theory. 44 Under this theory, corporate insiders, such as officers and directors, cannot trade the securities
of their corporation if they possess material, nonpublic information;
such knowledge gives rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading.4 5 The classical theory relies on two principal elements. 46 First, by
virtue of their access to material, nonpublic information, insiders owe
a duty to their corporation and their shareholders to use such information to further the corporation's interest, rather than to advance
their personal pecuniary interest. 47 Second, it is inherently unfair if a
corporate insider exploits knowledge of material, nonpublic informa48
tion to take advantage of an unwitting counterparty.
Seventeen years later, in United States v. O'Hagan,49 the Supreme
50
Court sanctioned the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
Under the misappropriation theory, unlike the classical theory, a
party owes a duty not to the issuing corporation, or its shareholders,
or the trading counterparty, but rather to the source of the material,
nonpublic information on which that party trades. 5 1 This duty persists
even if the source of the information has no connection to the corpo(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
40
41

See id.; ALLEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 643-45.
See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 8, § 3.01.
SeeJAMES D. Cox,

ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURrrIES REGU629 (4th ed. 2004).
See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976).
44
See O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 651-52 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980)); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983).
45
See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52.
46
See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 226-27 (citing In reCady, Roberts& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911
(1961)).
42

LATION
43

47
48

49
50
51

See id.
See id.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
See id. at 652-53.
Id.
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rate issuer.52 Thus, the premise for liability is a deception of the
source of the nonpublic information, and not of the issuing corporation or the counterparty. 5 3 O'Hagan implies that a trader in possession of material, nonpublic information could avoid liability under
Rule lOb-5 by revealing an intention to trade to the source of the information, 54 even if the trader never discloses the material, nonpublic
information to its trading counterparty. 5 5 This liability carve-out in
O'Hagansubsequently gave birth to the idea of big boy letters-agreements that allow a party to trade on material, nonpublic information
56
without having to disclose any such information.
Practitioners then drafted big boy letters, seeking to avoid Rule
10b-5 liability by having their counterparties disclaim reliance on, and
waive any future claims arising out of, the nondisclosures. 57 But this
tactic implicates the anti-waiver provision of the Exchange Act, section 29(a), which reads in full: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of
this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an
exchange required thereby shall be void. ''58 Although the language of
section 29 (a) casts doubt on the enforceability of big boy letters, practitioners continue to rely on them heavily.
II
BIG Boy LETTERS SHOULD BE ENFORCEABLE DESPITE
SECTION 29(A)

A.

Signatory Does Not Waive a Potentially Meritorious Claim

The threshold issue regarding the enforceability of big boy letters
in private suits is whether they are enforceable under the anti-waiver
provision of the Exchange Act, section 29(a).59 The Supreme Court
provided some insight into this issue in Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc.
52
Id. at 653 ("The misappropriation theory is thus designed to protect the integrity of
the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation who have access to
confidential information that will affect the corporation's security price when revealed, but
who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders.") (internal citation
omitted).
53
See id. at 656 ("[T]he person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade,
but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information.").
54
See id. at 655 ("Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source
that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive device' and
thus no § 10(b) violation . . ").
55
Adair & Lawrence, supra note 32.
56
See id.; see also LEMKE & LINS, supra note 13, § 2.169 n.1 (noting that big boy letters
derive some support from United States v. O'Hagan).
57
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
58
15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2006).
59
Recall that a signatory to a big boy letter waives all claims related to the nondisclosure of the material, nonpublic information. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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v. McMahon,60 which remains the law on the interpretation of the antiwaiver provision. The plaintiffs in the case were Eugene and Julia McMahon, customers of Shearson/American Express (Shearson), an
SEC-registered brokerage firm. 6 ' Julia McMahon signed customer
agreements with Shearson that provided for arbitration of any controversy relating to any of the McMahons' accounts. 62 When the
McMahons filed suit against Shearson alleging, inter alia, that Shearson violated section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, Shearson moved to compel
arbitration. 63 The district court held that the allegations were arbitrable, 6 4 but the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the arbitration
65
agreement waived compliance with section 27 of the Exchange Act
and was therefore void under section 29(a).66
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, declaring that
section 29(a) forbids the "enforcement of agreements to waive 'compliance' with the provisions of [the Exchange Act]" or "waiver[s] of the
substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act." 6 7 Since section
27 does not itself impose any statutory duty, the arbitration agreement
did not violate section 29.68 The Court then said that the relevant
section 29(a) inquiry is "whether the agreement 'weaken[s] [one's]
ability to recover under the [Exchange] Act"' 69 and that an arbitration agreement would not do so. 70 The Court added that the voluntariness of such an agreement is irrelevant-"if a stipulation waives
compliance with a statutory duty, it is void under section 29(a),
71
whether voluntary or not."
The interpretation of section 29(a) by other courts is instructive
as well. In Korn v. FranchardCorp.,72 the Southern District of New York
upheld a broad release of a matured claim made by a sophisticated
party who had knowledge of the claim. 73 The court relied on Wilko v.
Swan7 4 to support the proposition that section 29(a) prohibits antici-

61
62

482 U.S. 220 (1987).
See id. at 222-23.
See id. at 223.

63
64

See id.
See MCMAHON V. SHEARSON/AM.

60

EXPRESS, INC., 618 F. Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.

1985).
65 Section 27 provides: "The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
66 See McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1986).
67 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 482 U.S. at 228 (emphasis added).
68

See id.

69
70

Id. at 230 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)).
See id. at 231-34.

71

Id. at 230.

72
73
74

388 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
See id. at 1328-30.
346 U.S. 438 (1953).
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patory waivers of compliance, not waivers of known and matured
claims. 75 The Seventh Circuit took a further step, ruling that waivers
of Rule lOb-5 claims that "should have [been] known upon reasonable inquiry" are valid as well. 7 6 Still, Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian77 is

the most promising for the practice of big boy letters. In that case, the
Ninth Circuit, focusing on the sophistication of the parties, decided
that even unknown securities claims could be waived without violating
section 29(a) .78 Specifically, the court stated that when "a release is
signed in a commercial context by parties in a roughly equivalent bargaining position and with ready access to counsel, the general rule is
that, if 'the language of the release is clear .... the intent of the par-

ties [is] indicated by the language employed.' 79
Perhaps counterintuitively, big boy letters do not constitute an
impermissible waiver under section 29(a). Section 29(a) "forecloses
anticipatory waivers of compliance with the duties imposed by Rule
10b-5."80 However, a party that demands a big boy letter does not seek
a waiver of compliance with the securities laws; rather, it seeks only to
preclude costly and meridess 8 ' litigation relating to the nondisclosure
of the nonpublic information.8 2 For an agreement to violate section
29(a), there must be a waiver of a potentially meritorious claim. As
discussed below in Part III.A, no such claim exists with respect to big
boy letters, since there is no duty to disclose the material, nonpublic
information and since big boy letters are not deceptive or fraudulent.
Essentially, the signatory to a big boy letter only waives its ability to file
a suit that has no prospect of recovery anyway. In Shearson terms, a big
boy letter does not "weaken" the signatory's ability to recover under
75
See Korn, 388 F. Supp. at 1329 ("To rule otherwise would foreclose the parties from
settling matured claims and force every claimant to pursue the litigation to its costly
conclusion.").
76
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 403 (7th Cir. 1978).

967 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1342.
79
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Locafrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys. Leasing, 558 F.2d 1113, 1115 (2d Cir. 1977)).
80
AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2003).
81 Part 1II.A explains that such litigation is meritless because in nearly all instances,
the party with superior information is under no duty to disclose the material, nonpublic
information. Nonetheless, even if there were a duty to disclose, the quasi-disclosure provided by big boy letters would satisfy any such duty. The signaling effect of big boy letters,
together with the sophistication of the parties, obviates the need for full disclosure while
concomitantly conforming to Rule IOb-5 jurisprudence. See infra Part lII.A for a full discussion of these concepts. Even if any of these statements are untrue, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the big boy signatory to prove reasonable reliance. See infra Part
II.B.
82
See McTague, In Insider Case, supra note 13, at 1893 ("The party with the undisclosed inside information wants insurance that its counterparty will not claim in the future
that the counterparty was defrauded due to nondisclosure of the information . . ").
77
78
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the Exchange Act, since the signatory would not have been able to
83
recover.
Why, then, do sophisticated parties insist on obtaining big boy
letters? There are at least a few reasons. That big boy letters are not
deceptive or fraudulent has yet to garner judicial support, given the
lack of cases concerning them. Part III.A draws from relevant case law
to argue that big boy letters are neither deceptive nor fraudulent. Understandably, corporate attorneys and institutional investors do not

want to test these arguments in costly legal battles-they simply want
to prevent such battles altogether. To that end, the party that demands a big boy letter believes that the counterparty, as a matter of
principle, will live up to its promise and not pursue any legal action.
The paucity of cases on big boy letters seems to indicate that they do
indeed implement this sort of market discipline. Also, in the absence
of a big boy letter, an aggrieved signatory, perhaps feeling cheated by
the counterparty's information advantage, might be more likely to
pursue legal action. Finally, the signaling effect of big boy letters, and
the quasi-disclosure that they afford,8 4 diminishes the chances of any
ex post litigation. Big boy letters make it more difficult for the signatory to later claim that the counterparty deceived or defrauded it, particularly in light of the signatory's sophistication. In this sense, they
provide a level of comfort to the party with the superior information.
B.

Policy Considerations

An examination of the policies underlying the securities laws
demonstrates that big boy letters between sophisticated parties are not
the type of matter that concerned Congress when it passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Acts). It
is clear that the Acts were "primarily designed with the protection of
investors in mind. 85 In particular, the Acts "were intended to safeguard investors from overreaching by industry professionals who held
inherently superior bargaining positions. ''86 A principal aim of Con83 As clarified in Part III.A, the signatory cannot recover for any claim arising from
the nondisclosure of material, nonpublic information. However, the signatory can recover
if, for example, the counterparty made misleading disclosures. That a big boy letter is a
limited waiver applying only to claims relating to the nondisclosure is significant in establishing its enforceability. A more sweeping waiver could violate section 29(a) if it compromised any potentially meritorious claims that the signatory might have. See infra Part III.A.
84 See infra Part III.
85 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 246 (1987) (BlackmunJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract:
The Trojan Horse of Rule lOb-5, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 891 (1994) ("[T]he 1933 and
1934 Acts were enacted in significant measure for the protection of investors.").
86
Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities
Regulation by PrivateAgreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 576 (1999); see also C. Edward
Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1133
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gress was to redress the rampant fraud that average investors faced in
the financial markets, 87 where those with greater knowledge and bargaining power were swindling investors. One author notes that "a fundamental purpose of the securities laws is to protect those who cannot
protect themselves." 88 Another argues that, "except for the 1934 Act's
margin provisions, the [1933 and 1934] Acts' legislative history shows
that nearly every provision was motivated, either directly or indirectly,
by concerns with predation on individual investors." 89 Such fears are
absent when it comes to big boy letters, which are agreements between sophisticated parties with equal bargaining power, 90 each presumably advised by competent counsel.
That the securities laws are not concerned with dealings among
sophisticated parties is evident upon inspection of the 1933 Securities
Act. One example is section 4(2).91 Private offerings of securities can
take place without compliance with the registration and prospectus
delivery requirements of the Securities Act through reliance on the
exemption provided by section 4(2), which applies to transactions by
an issuer not involving a public offering. 92 Prior to 1982, the SEC
generally required an issuer seeking to rely on section 4(2) to make
a subjective determination that each offeree had sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to enable
that offeree to evaluate the merits of the prospective investment or
that such offeree was able to bear the economic risk of the
investment.

93

In other words, the offeree must have been a sophisticated investor.
The SEC adopted Regulation D to alleviate some of the uncertainty
inherent in making such a subjective determination and "to establish
non-exclusive 'safe harbor' criteria for the section 4(2) private offer("As a historical matter, Congress did not design the securities laws to protect investors
capable of protecting themselves.").
87
See Fletcher, supra note 86, at 1133.
88
Welle, supra note 86, at 545.
89 Fletcher, supra note 86, at 1134.
90
Bargaining power does not refer solely to the relative strength of a party's negotiating position. It also refers to a party's ability to protect itself during the transaction, e.g., by
its sophistication, by conducting due diligence and other research, by proceeding with the
guidance of lawyers, by pressing for contractual protections, etc.
91
15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
92
See 1 THOMAs LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.1 [2]
(5th ed. 2005) (noting that the exemption in § 4 "dispense[s] with the 1933 Act's registration and prospectus delivery requirements"); see also I id. § 4.24[1] ("Section 4(2) of the
1933 Act exempts 'transactions not involving any public offering'" and is "commonly referred to as the private placement exemption."). See generally 1 id. § 4.24[1] (elaborating
on the scope of the section 4(2) exemption).
93
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited
Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 403 (Jan. 4, 2007) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 and 275).
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ing exemption. '9 4 Under Rule 506 of Regulation D, an issuer may sell
its securities to a fixed number of sophisticated investors and an unlimited number of accredited investors without complying with the
registration requirements of the Securities Act, unless the issuer is subject to another restriction.9 5 In turn, Rule 501 of Regulation D often
defines an accredited investor by monetary benchmarks.9 6 The SEC
uses wealth as a proxy for sophistication, presuming that wealthy individuals are knowledgeable and experienced enough not to require all
the protections of the securities laws. 9 7 Such sophisticated parties do
not lack bargaining power and are capable of protecting themselves.9 8
The Supreme Court agrees with the above reasoning. The Court
defines a private offering as "[a] n offering to those who are shown to
be able to fend for themselves."9 9 A private offering exemption, like
that permitted under section 4(2), pertains to transactions "where
there is no practical need" for the application of the Securities Act.100
Consequently, the availability of the exemption "should turn on
whether the particular class of persons affected need[s] the protection of the Act."19 ' Sophisticated or wealthy parties, apparently, do
not need all the protections of the securities laws.
There are still other instances where the securities laws make exceptions for sophisticated investors. Section 4(6) of the Securities Act
exempts "transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer solely to
one or more accredited investors" from the registration and prospectus delivery requirements, so long as the aggregate offering price does
not exceed $5 million.10 2 SEC Rule 144A provides safe harbor from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act for private resale of
restricted securities to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). 10 3 A QIB
is any institution that owns more than $100 million worth of investable
94

Id.

at 404.

See Fletcher, supra note 86, at 1123 ("Neither category of sales-to accredited investors or to sophisticated investors-requires registration, presumably because neither group
requires the protections that registration affords.").
96
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007).
97
See Fletcher, supra note 86, at 1124 ("[T]he SEC assumes either that wealthy investors are always sophisticated or that they, no matter how naive, do not need the protection
of the 1933 Act's registration provisions."). The naive but wealthy investor who lacks
knowledge or experience at least has enough financial resources to purchase expert advice
and benefit from the judgment of a professional.
98
See I HAZEN, supra note 92, § 4.24[1] ("The exemption for non-public offerings
applies to offerings to institutional investors that are sufficiently sophisticated and have
sufficiently strong bargaining positions that they do not need the protections of federal
registration.").
99 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
100
Id. at 122 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5 (1933)).
101
Id. at 125.
102
15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2006).
103
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2007).
95
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assets. 10 4 Although Rule 144A only applies to a limited class of securities, it allows QIBs to trade among themselves ad infinitum without
having to adhere to the Act's registration requirements. 10 5 Accordingly, it is clear that the SEC often relaxes securities laws for sophisticated and wealthy parties, as they have the knowledge, experience,
and bargaining power to protect themselves.
The foregoing illustrates why big boy letters, agreements between
sophisticated parties with equal bargaining power, should be enforceable under section 29(a) of the Exchange Act. Although the legislative and administrative histories of section 29(a) are silent as to
whether a defendant can assert a waiver defense,1 0 6 the principles and
policies of securities laws demand that big boy letters receive judicial
enforcement. Congress's concern for protecting the investor is incongruent with the realities of big boy transactions, where sophisticated
parties negotiate with equal bargaining power, and can thus protect
themselves. There is no worry that a hedge fund will pull the wool
over the eyes of an investment bank.
III
BIG

Boy LETTERS

OFFER PROTECTION EVEN IF THEY ARE

NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER SECTION

29(A)

Suppose that Seller and Buyer, both sophisticated parties, initiate a
discussion for the sale of securities. At the very outset, Seller informs
Buyer that the latter will need to sign a big boy letter to consummate
any such sale. Immediately, Buyer realizes several key points. That
Seller is asking for a big boy letter notifies Buyer that Seller has nonpublic information and that such information is material' 0 7 to the sale. If
neither of these were true, there would be no need for a big boy letter
104 See id. § 230.144A(1)(i).
105 See 1 HAZEN, supra note 92, § 4.30[4] ("Indeed, the rule contemplates the formation of an active trading market in Rule 144A securities, in which qualified institutions and
dealers can enter bids and offers.").
106

5D ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES

UNDER THE SECURITIES

LAWS

§ 19:32 (2008) ("Having defined the defense of waiver, the next question is when defendants in lOb-5 cases can assert it successfully. Not surprisingly, the legislative and administrative histories of the Rule shed no light on this issue."); see also Note, Applicability of
Waiver, Estoppel, and Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule lOb5: Deterrence and Equity in Balance, 73 YALE L.J. 1477, 1480 (1964) ("The Securities Act does
not explicitly state whether [a waiver] defense[ ] can be used in actions under the civil
liabilities sections. The legislative history, moreover, contains no evidence of congressional
intent on the precise issue.").
107
The information must be material in some sense, otherwise a rational party would
not incur the additional costs required to obtain a big boy letter. The principal cost is the
discount that Seller must offer on the underlying securities. Other costs include the time
and resources spent negotiating and drafting the big boy letter. It is plausible, however,
that a rational party would want a big boy letter even if it does not possess any material
information. See infra Part V.C.
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in the first place. Moreover, that Seller is looking to trade the securities, combined with the fact that Seller has material, nonpublic information, signals to Buyer that the information that Seller has must be
adverse. If the nonpublic information was indeed positive, Seller
would surely hold the securities until the good news materialized, so
that Seller could reap the benefits.
At this point, Buyer has two options-either Buyer can decline to
transact with Seller altogether or, fully appreciating the various risks
involved, Buyer can voluntarily move forward with the sale and sign a
big boy letter, knowing that Seller possesses adverse, material, nonpublic information that Seller will not disclose to Buyer. This Note argues
that if Buyer opts for the second option, the big boy letter should be
enforceable to preclude any claims arising out of the nondisclosures.
While Seller never transfers to Buyer the substance of the nonpublic information, Buyer does receive a powerful signal as to its qualitative characteristics, which serves as quasi-disclosure of the nonpublic
information. If Buyer is at all uncertain about the nature of the information, Buyer can still discover it during negotiations. In the above
example, Buyer is confident that Seller possesses unfavorable information regarding the underlying security. As such, Buyer will demand a
discount on the purchase price of the securities. If the nonpublic information were either positive or neutral, Seller would never trade the
securities at below-market prices. Thus, if Seller is willing to trade the
securities at a below-market price, this confirms Buyer's beliefs that the
nonpublic information is adverse. 10 8
Despite the fact that Buyer does not have perfect information, the
quasi-disclosure of the big boy letter informs Buyer as to the nature of
the material, nonpublic information. This new information allows
Buyer to update his beliefs regarding the underlying securities and to
adjust his valuation of those assets. It may also prompt Buyer to investigate diligently the public issuer of the securities to gain more information. In any case, the information disparity between Seller and Buyer is
not as great as it seems at first-Buyer receives a strong, albeit somewhat noisy, signal about the material, nonpublic information.
A.

Big Boy Letters Are Not Deceptive or Fraudulent

The argument for big boy letters begins with Chiarella v. United
States, 0 9 a seminal case that forms the "authoritative underpinnings of
108 The signatory to any big boy letter requires this risk premium for taking ownership
of the securities. The signatory will demand compensation (in the form of a reduced
purchase price) for the inherent risks involved in trading with a more informed
counterparty and for waiving any right to sue the counterparty for any nondisclosures.
109 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

148
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insider trading law under Rule lOb-5." 110 Chiarella was a financial
printer working in New York. II He handled various documents, including announcements of corporate takeover bids. 1 2 Although
these documents did not show the identities of the acquiring and target corporations, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target
corporations from other information in the documents. 1 3 Chiarella
traded on this material, nonpublic information, without ever disclosing it, and was able to turn a handsome profit. 1 14 Yet the Supreme
Court overturned Chiarella's conviction under section 10 (b) and Rule
lOb-5.115
The Court first looked to Cady, Roberts"1 6 and stated that insiders
cannot trade shares of their corporation without first disclosing all
material, nonpublic information."17 In other words, the Court endorsed the disclose or abstain rule, but restricted its application to
corporate insiders. 118 Since an insider is in a position of trust and
confidence with a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, the insider cannot cheat those shareholders by trading in the corporation's securities
on the basis of material, nonpublic information. 119 Consequently, in
the absence of such a special relationship, there can be no violation of
the disclose or abstain rule, and hence no breach of Rule lOb-5. 120 As
Justice Powell wrote for the majority, "one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits
fraud only when he is under a duty to do so," and "the duty to disclose
arises when one party has information that the other party is entitled
to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
21
confidence between them."'
The Court reversed Chiarella's conviction because he was not an
insider and had no relationship with the shareholders of the target
companies.' 22 In doing so, it explicitly refused to apply the disclose or
supra note 1, at 661.

110

ALLEN ET AL.,

III

Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224.
Id.

112

113
114

Id.

116

40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

See id. Prior to Chiarella's indictment, he reached an agreement with the SEC to
disgorge his profits to the people with whom he traded. Id.
'15
See id. at 237.
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-28.
See 445 U.S. at 227-28, 232-33.
120
See id. at 232-33 ("[T]he element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to
disclose-is absent in this case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the
sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them.
He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the
sellers only through impersonal market transactions.").
121
Id. at 228 (internal citations omitted).
122
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
117

118
119
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1 23
abstain rule to every person with material, nonpublic information.
The Court stated that "not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)" 24 and concluded:

When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose
under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information. The contrary result is without support in
the legislative history of § 10(b) and would be inconsistent with the
careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of the securi1 25
ties markets.
Chiarella thus bases section 10(b) liability on a breach of some duty,
rather than on simple unfairness. Therefore, it is apparent that trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in and of itself,
12 6
does not give rise to liability under Chiarella.
However, Chiarellaalone does not validate the use of big boy letters. While trading on material, nonpublic information does not give
rise to liability per se, a court could still find a disclosure or nondisclosure to be misleading under Rule lOb-5(b). 127 In the context of big
boy letters, one must ask whether there is a duty to disclose the material, nonpublic information and whether a disclosure or nondisclo12 8
sure is misleading.
Two recent Circuit Court decisions demonstrate that quasi-disclosure of material, nonpublic information identical in nature to that
provided by big boy letters, in the framework of a securities transaction between sophisticated parties, does not give rise to Rule lOb-5
liability. In McCormick v. Fund American Companies,12 9 the plaintiff, Mc123
Id. at 233 ("We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general
duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material,
nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs radically from
the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties,
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.") (citation omitted).
Id. at 232.
124
125

Id. at 235.

See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text; see also United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 690-91 (1997) (Thomas, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Als
as we have repeatedly held, use of nonpublic information to trade is not itself a violation of
§ 10(b)."); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983) ("Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information
before trading. . . .") (emphasis added).
127
Rule 10b-5(b) makes it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(b) (2007). Although manufacturing such misleading statements violates Rule
lOb-5, it falls outside the scope of insider trading.
128
One must also consider whether there is any misappropriation of confidential information. Part IV analyzes big boy letters in the context of the misappropriation theory.
26 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1994).
129
126
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Cormick, was the CEO of a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant,
Fund American Companies (FAC).130 A year after resigning from his
position, McCormick agreed to sell all of his shares in FAC back to the
firm. 131 Prior to finalizing the sale, however, FAC informed McCormick that a foreign company might soon begin negotiations to
purchase the subsidiary. 132 FAC also informed McCormick that if
such a deal were to go through, the value of his FAC shares would
appreciate. 133 McCormick asked for the name of the foreign firm, but
FAC declined to divulge any further information, asserting that such
information was confidential. 134 McCormick then signed a document
acknowledging that he had "been fully and adequately informed of
the foregoing facts and circumstances,"' 3 5 and the parties consum136
mated the sale.
Sure enough, the foreign company purchased the FAC subsidiary
and the value of FAC stock rose dramatically. 137 McCormick sued
FAC for, inter alia, violating Rule lOb-5 by making a misleading misstatement or omission of material fact. 1 38 In affirming summary judgment against McCormick, the Ninth Circuit focused on FAC's quasidisclosure and McCormick's sophistication. 1 39 The court found that
FAC "neither disclosed nor failed to disclose; instead, it told the plaintiff that it had certain information (the name of the buyer), but that
the information was confidential." 1 40 McCormick voluntarily decided
to sell his stock despite understanding that he was missing material
facts. The court decided that, "particularly in light of McCormick's
14 1
considerable sophistication, [such] quasi-disclosure was sufficient."'
Since "[t]he disclosures were accurate, and the information was adequate for McCormick to act upon," there was no misrepresentation,
142
no misleading conduct, no deceit, and no fraud.
In Jensen v. Kimble,1 43 a similar issue confronted the Tenth Circuit.
Kimble, a lawyer representing Sage Court Ventures, requested that
Jensen, a shareholder of Sage Court, sell him nearly one million
shares of Sage Court at below-market price. 144 Kimble informed Jen130

Id. at 872.

131

See id.

132
133
134

See id. at 874.
See id.
See id. at 875.

135

Id. at 874.

136

Id. at 875.

137
138

See id.
See id.

139

See id. at 879-80.

140
141

Id. at 879.
Id.
Id. at 884.

142

143

1 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 1993).

144

See id. at 1074-75.
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sen that he was negotiating a sale for Sage Court and thatJensen's sale
"could potentially solidify" 145 a takeover of Sage. Jensen asked Kimble
to identify the other company and the players in the deal, but Kimble
refused to divulge their identities.146 Nonetheless, Jensen decided to
proceed with the sale, testifying that he was "getting a good return on
the stock being sold" and that "the sale still left them with a substantial
number of shares upon which he hoped [he] would realize even
147
greater profit after the deal was done."
The deal never materialized as the Kimble and Sage Court had
envisioned, and Jensen eventually sued Kimble for making material
misrepresentations and omissions in violation of Rule lOb-5. 14s The
Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Jensen, stating
that, "because Kimble specifically advised Jensen of [the] nondisclosures ... Jensen sold [his] stock with full awareness of Kimble's omissions. 1 49 The court went on to say that " [e] yen when a relationship of
trust exists between two parties, however, where the non-disclosing
party explicitly informs the other party of his failure to disclose, an
omission will not be misleading in the absence of special circumstances." 150 Such "special circumstances" include "the inability of the
dependant party to understand or appreciate the significance of the
undisclosed information." 151 Such a situation did not exist in this
case, asJensen was a "very experienced, sophisticated investor who was
under no compulsion to sell" his shares. 152 Kimble "clearly notified
Jensen that Kimble was not disclosing certain information with respect
to the Sage Court deal."153 Therefore, "by virtue of the disclosures
that Kimble did make, Jensen knew what he didn't know." 154 As such,
there was no misrepresentation, no misleading conduct, no deceit,
15 5
and no fraud.
The foregoing rationale is directly applicable to trades involving
big boy letters among sophisticated parties. In such trades, the signaling effect of big boy letters provides a level of quasi-disclosure of the
145

Id. at 1075.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

See id. at 1076.
Id. at 1077.
150
Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). The court continued to say that "[u]nder these circumstances, even assuming arguendo that a special relationship of trust existed between
Jensen and Kimble, we do not believe it can be said that Kimble's omissions misled Jensen
with respect to any of Kimble's other remarks." Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1078 n.9.
153
Id. at 1078.
154
Id.
155
See id. ("Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, we conclude that Kimble's omissions were neither manipulative nor deceptive
within the meaning of Rule lOb-5 and thus are not actionable under this rule.").
149
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nonpublic information, just as in McCormick and in Jensen. Depending
on the circumstances, this quasi-disclosure will satisfy any disclosure
obligations that a party may have, since full disclosure is not required
absent a special relationship. 56 Even if a special relationship exists,
an omission may not be misleading if the nondisclosing party informs
the counterparty of the nondisclosure. 1 57 Like the plaintiffs in Jensen
and in McCormick, the signatory to a big boy letter is a sophisticated
party in a face-to-face transaction, alert to the information asymmetry
and aware that its counterparty will not divulge certain material facts.
Since the signatory knows what he does not know, 1 58 there can be no
deceit or fraud, which are the gravamen of Rule lOb-5 liability. 159 Accordingly, the waiver clause of a big boy letter should be enforceable.
Since there is no Rule 10b-5 violation, the signatory does not waive
any potentially meritorious claim; any claim that the signatory brings
relating to the nondisclosure will be meritless.
Furthermore, the signatory is under no obligation to carry out
the transaction. The sophisticated signatory's voluntary decision to
carry out the transaction is made with full appreciation of all the risks
and possible outcomes of the trade. By carrying out the transaction,
the signatory assumes the risks associated with it, thus preventing the
signatory from later claiming that it was deceived or defrauded. Thus,
the Second Circuit is correct in stating that where "a party has been
put on notice of the existence of material facts which have not been
documented and he nevertheless proceeds with a transaction . . .he

may truly be said to have willingly assumed the business risk"'160 and
therefore "will not be heard to complain that he has been defrauded. ' 16 1 Indeed, "[t]he purpose of the [1934] Act is to protect

the innocent investor, not one who loses his innocence and then waits
to see how his investment turns out before he decides to invoke the

156
157
158

See supra notes 119-20, 139-41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
It is important for practitioners who draft big boy letters to specify the type of

nonpublic information that is being withheld-e.g., business plans, financial projections,
etc.-so that signatories are put on notice as to what they do not know and what they
cannot rely on. As a corollary, big boy letters should be individually tailored for each
transaction.
159
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) ("Section 10(b) is aptly
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud."). Indeed, absent any
fraud, even a breach of fiduciary duty does not violate Rule 10b-5. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) ("[T]he claim of fraud and fiduciary breach .. .
states a cause of action under any part of Rule lOb-5 only if the conduct alleged can be
fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of the statute.").
160
Lazard Freres & Co. v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 1531, 1543 (2d Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted).
161
Id.
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provisions of the Act. ' 16 2 Courts should not unwind transactions be-

tween sophisticated parties involving big boy letters.
B.

Big Boy Letters Preclude Reasonable Reliance

Even if big boy letters are void under section 29(a), they can refute a plaintiff's claim of reasonable reliance. 16 A private suit under
Rule 10b-5 requires that the plaintiff prove reasonable reliance. 16 4 In
a transaction involving big boy letters, the plaintiffs allegations would
presumably hinge, in one way or another, on the defendant's nondisclosure of the material, nonpublic information. That is, the plaintiff
would have to argue that the defendant's failure to disclose the material, nonpublic information caused the plaintiff to consummate the
transaction and that had the plaintiff received the material, nonpublic
information beforehand, the plaintiff would not have proceeded with
the transaction. However, a big boy letter shows that the signatory
could not have possibly expected informational parity. Therefore, the
signatory could not have reasonably relied on any nondisclosure.
Several cases support this reasoning. Most instructive are those
cases that deal with non-reliance clauses, 165 which are analogous to
big boy letters. Non-reliance clauses, often included in heavily negotiated purchase agreements,1 66 specify that the buyer is relying only on
those representations contained in the final written contract. 67 The
aim of these clauses is to prevent an aggrieved party from subsequently claiming it relied on any oral or written representations excluded from the final agreement. 68 Similarly, the signatory to a big
boy letter disclaims reliance on any withheld material, nonpublic information.' 69 The Seventh Circuit succinctly summarized the thrust
of the reasonable reliance argument, stating that "[s]ince reliance is
an element of fraud, the [non-reliance] clause, if upheld-and why
162
163

Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962).
See Older & Bloomstein, supra note 12, at 39-40 (" [E]ven if the 'claim waiver' provi-

sion of a big boy letter is invalidated, the non-reliance provision can serve as a 'backstop'
defense to a claim under the SEC's Rule lOb-5 dealing with fraudulent actions, since a
plaintiff must, in most circumstances, prove 'reasonable reliance' to prevail.").
164
See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
165 Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 5-8 ("[S]ellers can hope to use non-reliance clauses
or big boy representations as evidence of a buyer's non-reliance at summary judgment or
trial.-).
166

Id.

at 6.

167 See AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 178 (2003) (explaining that the
signatory to a non-reliance agreement "would be entitled to rely solely on the representations and warranties it would be able to secure in 'any definitive agreement"').
168
See David K. Lutz, Note, The Law and Economics of Securities Fraud:Section 29(a) and
the Non-Reliance Clause, 79 CH.-KErr L. REv. 803, 804 (2004).
169 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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should it not be upheld, at least when the contract is between sophisticated commercial enterprises-precludes a fraud suit.'

70

In Harsco Corp. v. Segui,171 the plaintiff contracted to acquire all
the stock of MultiServ, a Netherlands corporation.1 72 The definitive
agreement included a set of representations, 173 as well as a non-reliance clause. 174 After closing, Harsco brought claims under Rule 1Ob-5
based on extra-contractual representations the defendant allegedly
made, t 75 and it argued that the non-reliance clause violated section
29(a). 176 The Second Circuit framed the issue as "whether parties
who negotiate at arm's length for the sale and purchase of a company
can define the transaction in a writing so as to preclude a claim of
fraud based on representations not made, and explicitly disclaimed,
in that writing.'

1 77

In affirming the district court's dismissal for failure to state a
claim, the Second Circuit focused on the fact that "there [was] a detailed writing developed via negotiations among sophisticated business entities and their advisors. ' 178 That writing "define[d] the
boundaries of the transaction," and "Harsco [brought the] suit principally alleging conduct that [fell] outside of those boundaries."' 179 Although for purposes of section 29(a) the non-reliance clause
weakened Harsco's ability to recover under the Exchange Act, "such a
'weakening' [did] not constitute a forbidden waiver of compliance."' 8 0 The Second Circuit focused on the sophistication of the parties and their equal bargaining power.' 8 ' The court then stated that
the non-reliance provision did not completely bar Harsco from suing;
rather, as one commentator noted, it "merely limited the universe of
potentially actionable representations."' 1 2 Any of the representations
in the final agreement, if fraudulent, could have served as "the basis of
a fraud action against the sellers."18 The Second Circuit adhered to
170

171

Vigortone AG Prods., Inc. v. PM AG Prods., Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2002).
91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996).

172

See id. at 340.

173

174
175

Id.
See id. at 342-43.
See id. at 341-42.

176

See id. at 343.

177
178

Id. at 339.
Id. at 343.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

See id. at 344 ("[]t is apparent from the complaint and the Agreement in this case

that both Harsco and defendants were sophisticated business entities negotiating at arm's
length. The Agreement here reflects this relative parity.").
182 Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 8.
183 Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 344.
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the Harsco court's reasoning seven years later in Emergent CapitalInvest18 4
ment Management, LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc.
In AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.,1 85 AES agreed to acquire a subsidiary of Dow, pursuant to an asset purchase agreement. 186 This
agreement contained a non-reliance provision.1 87 Shortly after acquiring the subsidiary, AES brought a Rule 10b-5 suit against Dow,
188
claiming reliance on representations absent in the final agreement.
Unlike the Second Circuit in Harsco, the Third Circuit ruled that enforcing "the non-reliance clauses to bar AES's fraud claims as a matter
of law would be inconsistent with Section 29(a)," as it would be "an
189
anticipatory waiver of potential future claims under Rule lOb-5."'
However, this case does not extinguish the utility of non-reliance
clauses. In remanding, the court noted that, "non-reliance clauses
are, of course, among the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of any reliance." 190 More specifically, "a
buyer in a non-reliance clause case will have to show more to justify its
reliance than would a buyer in the absence of such a contractual provision."19 1 Consequently, "cases involving a non-reliance clause in a
negotiated contract between sophisticated parties will often be appropriate candidates for resolution at the summary judgment stage."192
Either court's analysis of non-reliance clauses bodes favorably for
the utility of big boy letters. 193 Under the Harsco analysis, big boy letters limit claims by ruling out those that arise out of the nondisclosure. 19 4 The big boy letter, therefore, defines the boundaries of the
transaction for the parties, and allows them to proceed on the common ground that disclosure of the nonpublic information will not occur. The signatory, too, attests that it will not receive any of the
nonpublic information, and represents that it will not rely on the nondisclosure. 195 As such, the signatory cannot possibly be said to have
reasonably relied on the nondisclosure. Even under the AES approach, if a big boy letter does not dissolve a case at the summary
184
185
186

343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003).
See id. at 177.

187
188

See id. at 177-78.
Id.

189
190
191

Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.

192

Id.

193

However, given that the Second Circuit seems more embracing of non-reliance

Id.

clauses, it would be wise for practitioners to draft big boy letters with a New York choice of
law provision, rather than submit to the laws of Delaware, so that in the event of a dispute,
a court within the Second Circuit will hear the case.
194
See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
195
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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judgment stage, at the very least it raises the bar for a plaintiff attempting to prove reasonable reliance. 96
IV
BIG

Boy

LETTERS AND THE

SEC

To date, the SEC has yet to take an official position on the status
of big boy letters. 97 In recent months, however, four SEC officials
have commented on the practice. 9 8 These remarks, taken together
with the SEC's allegations in SEC v. Barclays Bank PLC,199 provide insight into the SEC's stance on big boy letters. In fact, they seem to
presage the SEC's strategy regarding such agreements.
According to an associate regional director at the SEC, the SEC
regards possible abuse of big boy letters as a "significant area of concern" 200 and mentioned that "the issue is getting a lot of attention. 2 1
In November 2007, an associate director in the SEC Division of Enforcement bluntly stated that big boy letters would not provide any
defense to an SEC charge of insider trading. 20 2 Several days prior, an
associate director in the SEC Division of Investment Management cautioned that "the SEC could be in a position to sue" over big boy letters. 20 3 To do so, the SEC "would just need to show that someone was
deceived." 2°1 4 That "someone" does not have to be the signatory to the
20 5
big boy letter, another associate regional director explained.
These comments all lead to one place-the misappropriation
theory of insider trading. Recall that the Supreme Court adopted the
misappropriation theory in the seminal case of United States v.
O'Hagan.20 6 O'Hagan was a partner at a law firm in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 20 7 In 1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) retained
his firm in connection with a potential tender offer for Pillsbury's
common stock. 20 8 While O'Hagan himself did not work on Grand
Met's takeover effort, he learned of Grand Met's plans and purchased
call options in the target company prior to the announcement of the
tender offer. 20 9 An SEC investigation concluded with a fifty-seven
196

200

See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
No. 07-CV-04427 (S.D.N.Y May 30, 2007).
Stoffregen, supra note 12 (quoting Thomas Biolsi).

201

Id.

202

See McTague, Not a Defense, supra note 30, at 1832.
Stoffregen, supra note 12 (quoting Doug Scheidt).
Id.
See McTague, In Insider Case, supra note 13, at 1893.
521 U.S. 642 (1997); see also text accompanying supra notes 49-56.
Id. at 647.
See id.
See id. at 647-48.

197

198
199

203
204

205
206
207
208
209
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count indictment against O'Hagan, seventeen of which alleged viola2 10
tions of Rule lOb-5.
O'Hagan's conduct, however unethical, lies outside the reach of
the classical theory of insider trading, since O'Hagan was not an insider of the target company whose shares he traded. 2 1' As such, there
was a need to reshape the theory supporting liability under Rule lOb5. The misappropriation theory holds that a trader violates section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 "when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the
source of the information."' 2 12 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, maintained that:
Under [the misappropriation] theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed,
self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds
the principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu of
premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's
deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential
21 3
information.
Thus, the trader owes a duty to the source of the nonpublic information, and not to the trading counterparty.2 1 4 As such, the trader per21 5
petuates a fraud on the source of the information.
When it comes to big boy letters, the SEC focuses on just this-a
fraud on the source of the information. In truth, this is the only way
that the SEC can interrupt trades involving big boy letters2 1 6 since, in
most instances, the classical theory will be inapplicable. A look at the
complaint in SEC v. Barclays Bank PLC217 reveals that the charges
"were brought squarely under the misappropriation doctrine. '2 18
Id. at 648.
Id. at 653 n.5 ("The Government could not have prosecuted O'Hagan under the
classical theory, for O'Hagan was not an 'insider' of Pillsbury, the corporation in whose
stock he traded.").
212
Id. at 652.
213
Id. at 652.
214
See id. at 652-53; see also id. at 690 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The dishonesty in misappropriation is in the relationship between the fiduciary and the principal, not in any relationship between the misappropriator and the
market.").
215
See id. at 656 (majority opinion) ("[Tihe person or entity defrauded is not the
other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information.").
216
See Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 9 n.4 ("Assuming that a trade would otherwise fit
within the rubric of the misappropriation theory ... reliance on a big boy letter is highly
questionable.").
217
No. 07-CV-04427 (S.D.N.Y May 30, 2007).
218
Revisiting Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 23; see, e.g., Complaint 17, Barclays Bank,
No. 07-CV-04427, availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp2132.
210
211
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This explains why the SEC "is taking a close look at the potential mis2 19
appropriation of inside information covered by big boy letters."
If a party misappropriates material, nonpublic information, the
2 20
ensuing use of a big boy letter will not mitigate that party's liability.
However, the party could avoid liability under the misappropriation
theory without abstaining from trading; if the party discloses to the
source of the nonpublic information its intent to trade on the basis of
that information, the party "forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory."2 2 1 The Court explained that, "[b]ecause the deception
essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to
the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that
he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive
device' and thus no § 10(b) violation." 222 The term "brazen misappropriator" is sometimes applied to the person who discloses an intention to trade to the information source, as the trader audaciously
declares an objective to misappropriate confidential, nonpublic infor223
mation while escaping insider trading liability.
To be sure, evading liability as a brazen misappropriator will be
impractical, if not impossible. If an investment bank informs a corporate client of the bank's intention to trade on nonpublic information
pertaining to the client, the bank knows that the corporation will not
be a client of the bank much longer. Aside from the practical hurdles, there may be legal obstacles as well. In SEC v. Rocklage,224 the
First Circuit made it quite nearly impossible to ever qualify as a brazen
misappropriator. 225 If future courts follow the Rocklage reasoning, it
would eliminate the brazen misappropriator scenario altogether.
Still, the misappropriation theory is not new; Rule 10b-5 liability
for misappropriating nonpublic information existed before big boy
letters. Indeed, it was the O'Hagandecision that precipitated the use
of big boy letters in the first place. 226 Nonetheless, big boy letters nepdf. An associate regional director at the SEC explained this approach at a December 3,
2007 conference. See McTague, In .InsiderCase, supra note 13, at 1893.
219
Stoffregen, supra note 12 (summarizing the statements of another regional
director).
220
See id.
221
See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997).
222

Id.

223 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider TradingRegulation: The PathDependent Choice
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REv. 1589, 1633-34, 1634 n.205
(1999).
224
470 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2006).
225
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 120 (2d ed. 2007)
("[The First Circuit's] reading of O'Hagan likely guts the brazen misappropriator
loophole.").
226
See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also Adair & Lawrence, supra note 32
("[T]he seminal case for [the use of big boy letters] is United States v. O'Hagan... .");John
D. Hogoboom et al., "BigBoy" Letters Raise Insider Trading Concerns In and Out of Bankruptcy,
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gotiated between sophisticated parties with equal bargaining power
should be judicially enforceable, absent misappropriation of nonpublic information. Where there is such misappropriation, big boy letters
will not shield a defendant from liability in an SEC enforcement action. 2 2 7 Upon this analysis, it becomes obvious that the threshold issue regarding big boy letters is fundamentally different in private suits
than in SEC actions; in the former, the main issue is whether the
agreement violates section 29 (a), whereas in the latter, the question is
whether there was any misappropriation of confidential information.
V
AREAS OF CONCERN AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Despite the great utility of big boy letters and their potential to
eliminate liability in private suits, the practice does have shortcomings. Such faults are not fatal, however, and the implementation of
certain rules or procedures can provide a viable remedy. This Part
presents three areas of concern and then explores potential solutions.
A.

Downstream Purchasers

Recall the hypothetical transaction between Seller and Buyer, first
presented in Part III. In that transaction, since Seller requested that
Buyer sign a big boy letter, Buyer received a potent signal as to the
qualitative nature of Seller's inside information and correctly presumed
that the information was adverse to Seller. Suppose that Buyer nonetheless signs a big boy letter and takes ownership of the securities.
After a change of heart, however, Buyer decides that it no longer wants
to own the securities. Must Buyer disclose to downstream purchasers
that it signed a big boy letter when it acquired the securities?
This was the very issue in R2 Investments LDC v. Salomon Smith Bar228

outlined in the Introduction. In that case, Smith Barney (at
the time operating as Salomon Smith Barney) sold over $20 million
worth of bonds toJeffries & Company using a big boy letter. 229 Hours
later, Jeffries resold those bonds to R2. R 2 sued, alleging that Jeffries
failed to make at least two necessary disclosures: thatJeffries signed a
big boy letter when it bought the bonds from Smith Barney, and that
ney,

LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC CLIENT ALERT (Lowenstein Sandier PC, Roseland, NJ), June 2007,

available at http://www.lowenstein.com/publications/articles/ (search "Publications
Search" for "big boy") ("Big boy letters, as a means of avoiding insider trading liability,
springs from the United States Supreme Court's recognition of the misappropriation theory of insider trading in its landmark ruling in United States v. O'Hagan.").
227 See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
228 No. 01-CV-03598 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2001).
229 See Anderson, supra note 14.
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Smith Barney traded the bonds while possessing material, nonpublic
230
information.
The concern here is simple to understand-big boy letters work
in great part because of the quasi-disclosure they provide. 23 1 If the
intermediary fails to tell a downstream purchaser of the existence of a
big boy letter further up the chain, the quasi-disclosure does not occur and the necessary signal does not transmit.
One can easily envision a scenario where two parties collude to
perpetuate a fraud on an unwitting third party by using big boy letters.
Suppose that in the R2 case, Smith Barney and Jeffries devised a plot
to "launder" the inside information, usingJeffries as the intermediary.
The unfortunate downstream purchaser, in this case R2, could face a
predicament: it is not in privity with the initial seller, Smith Barney,
and the intermediary technically lacks any material, nonpublic information, since it signed a big boy letter. 232 If the securities laws allowed such a scenario, then indeed "a giant loophole exists that
233
essentially makes the insider trading laws meaningless.
There are potential solutions to this problem. The initial seller
could draft a provision in the big boy letter that requires the downstream purchaser to execute its own big boy letter if it decides to resell
the securities. 234 Regardless, the intermediary would most likely demand a big boy letter 23 5 to protect itself as the new seller in the string
of transactions. 23 6 However, including such a provision in the big boy
letter provides the initial seller with some comfort that it will not be
pulled into litigation should the intermediary fail to disclose the existence of a big boy letter to a downstream purchaser.
Another potential solution is for the initial seller to include a
lock-up agreement in the big boy letter. 237 The lock-up agreement
230 See Bodner et al., supra note 11, at 4.
231 See supra Part III.A.
232 The intermediary, though, knows that it signed a big boy letter. This knowledge
alone could constitute material, nonpublic information, depending on the circumstances.
233 Anderson, supra note 14 (quoting a spokesperson for R 2 Investments). Of course,
the existence of a big boy letter is itself material, nonpublic information, and the intermediary violates Rule lOb-5 by not disclosing it to the downstream purchaser.
234 See Adair & Lawrence, supra note 32.
235 The main reason an intermediary would not execute a big boy letter is because it
could command a higher price for the securities without one. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
236 See Anderson, supra note 14 ("If I am the buyer and I want to resell, it would be
prudent for the new seller to enter into a big-boy letter. You are protecting yourself to the
new buyer in the chain." (quoting Howard Seife, the head of the bankruptcy practice at
Chadbourne & Park)).
237 See id. A lock-up agreement is contractual assurance, usually obtained by underwriters in an initial public offering, that prohibits certain parties from selling any shares for
a specified period. While the terms vary, lock-up agreements typically last for 180 days. See
Securities and Exchange Commission, Initial Public Offerings, Lockup Agreements, http:/
/www.sec.gov/answers/lockup.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
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would prevent the downstream purchaser from reselling the securities
for a limited time. The idea is that, while the securities are locked-up,
the nonpublic information will become public, allowing the purchaser
to trade the securities free of any restrictions. This alternative is less
attractive than the first, though. A party that agrees to such a lock-up
will demand a higher risk premium for taking possession of illiquid
and tainted securities. At least under the first approach, the signatory
can resell the securities, provided it executes a big boy letter with the
next downstream purchaser.
The final possibility would be to enact a rule that compels the
intermediary to pass along that vital piece of information-that it
signed a big boy letter to purchase the securities. It is worth considering how much disclosure to mandate. Should the intermediary have
to name the party it transacted with? This seems only fair, as it places
the downstream purchaser in the same position as the intermediary at
the time when the latter was judging its potential purchase. Should
the intermediary disclose the number of times the underlying securities have changed hands in a big boy transaction and identify all upstream parties? This, too, is significant, as the signal gets noisier with
each downstream transaction. Each of these bits of information provides the downstream purchaser with additional knowledge that it can
use to infer the nature of the material, nonpublic information,
thereby continuing the chain of necessary quasi-disclosures. The
downstream purchaser does not receive all this information when it
merely signs a big boy letter. Therefore, this approach is superior to
either of the previous potential solutions because the buyer receives
information of greater value without any added transaction costs, 2 3 8
without the intermediary violating any contractual duties, and without
the burden of a lock-up agreement.
Even considering these potential solutions, there are still lingering issues. For instance, at what point does the new seller in a chain of
transactions not have to disclose the existence of a big boy letter to
resell the securities? Imagine a chain of securities trades whereby A
sells to B, who sells to C, who sells to D, who sells to E, and so forth.
Under the third solution outlined above, each new seller would have
to disclose the existence of all the big boy transactions up the chainand the parties involved-with each new downstream purchaser. At
some point, however, the material, nonpublic information will have
become public, obviating the need to continue this string of disclosures. Yet, since the initial seller is the only one with the nonpublic
information, only the initial seller will know when that information
has become public, and downstream parties will continue to abide by
238
The transaction costs may, in fact, be lower, as the parties no longer need to draft
and negotiate a big boy letter.
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this compulsory disclosure rule. Perhaps a bright line rule that establishes that a downstream seller no longer needs to make disclosures
once the public issuer files its next quarterly statement would avert
this dilemma.
The most acute challenge, however, does not arise in face-to-face
exchanges, such as those contemplated by this Note or involved in the
R' case. A more serious challenge materializes when a big boy signatory unloads the toxic securities into the public markets through impersonal transactions. Indeed, it would be very difficult to trace the
subsequent sale back to the initial seller. Transactions on impersonal
markets, however, are beyond the scope of this Note.
B.

Indirect Tipping Effect

The issue of an indirect tipping effect arises out of a big boy letter's most essential elements-the quasi-disclosure it provides and its
signaling effect. As previously discussed, big boy letters provide a
strong signal as to the nature of the nonpublic information. Building
upon the hypothetical transaction depicted in Part III, assume that
Buyer, upon being told that it must sign a big boy letter to consummate the sale, walks away from the bargaining table. But Buyer does
not leave the negotiations empty-handed, as Buyer now realizes that
there is adverse, material, nonpublic information relating to the underlying security. Theoretically, Buyer can then enter the marketplace
and purchase put options, or otherwise short sell, the underlying security. The quasi-disclosure of a big boy letter, therefore, indirectly
tips off any potential big boy signatory. Interestingly, such tipping
may trigger tipper/tippee liability, under an expansive formulation of
239
the rule established by the Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC.
This issue of an indirect tipping effect is simply a variation of the
downstream purchaser issue. In both cases, a party takes advantage of
the quasi-disclosure provided by big boy letters and converts it for
239
463 U.S. 646 (1983). The tipper is the corporate insider who forwards the nonpublic information, and the tippee is the outside party who receives that information. See id. at
655-56.
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been
a breach.
Id. at 660. The test for determining tipper liability is "whether the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Id. at 662. The tippee's liability depends on the tipper's motivations. "Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach
of duty to stockholders," and "absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach"
by the tippee. Id. The Dirks test creates an asymmetry: if a tippee violates Rule lOb-5, so
does the tipper, yet a tipper alone can violate the rule. See id.; see also 3 HAZEN, supra note
92, § 12.17[5] (describing the broad scope of tipper/tippee liability and how it is not constrained to cases of true insiders).
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their own personal gain. And in both cases, the best solution is the
same: force the party who received the quasi-disclosure to transfer that
information to any future counterparties. In the context of big boy
letters, the traditional "disclose or abstain" rule must morph into a
"disclose the quasi-disclosure or abstain" rule. This rule would ensure
that the signaling effect of big boy letters carries on during the stream
of transactions, as the efficacy of such agreements is pinned to the
quasi-disclosure they provide.
C.

Overuse of Big Boy Letters

The overuse of big boy letters is a distant danger of limited scope.
Suppose that, over time, practitioners find that big boy letters do indeed protect their clients from liability when trading on the basis on
material, nonpublic information. Some practitioners, then, may insist
on obtaining big boy letters for their clients as a matter of routineeither because they are unsure if their client has material, nonpublic
information or simply because they are risk-averse. Initially, this may
not seem like a realistic concern, given that the party demanding a big
boy letter must lower its asking price. To that party though, a lower
price could very well be worth eliminating insider trading liability and
the corresponding reputational harm.
The issue with overusing big boy letters is that, at a certain point,
big boy letters begin to lose their signaling feature. If big boy letters
become customary in securities transactions, signatories will become
inure to the quasi-disclosures they provide and discount them altogether. Once the signaling effect of a big boy letter is removed-either when a seller does not transmit it to a downstream purchaser or,
as in this case, when a downstream purchaser ignores it-the utility of
a big boy letter evaporates. Seller, now, may encounter liability, since
the quasi-disclosure never occurs. Furthermore, if big boy letters become a mere formality, it would undermine Seller's argument that reasonable reliance on the nondisclosure is lacking.
Once market participants begin to realize the proliferation of big
boy letters in securities transactions, a rational response by the signatory would be to ask for a representation in the big boy letter concerning the counterparty's possession of material, nonpublic information.
Thus, the signatory to a big boy letter can confirm whether the
counterparty is actually withholding information. The inclusion of
such a representation makes concerns regarding the overuse of big
boy letters somewhat of an academic exercise and thus, the harm is
limited in scope.

164
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CONCLUSION

Big boy letters can be an effective tool in enhancing market liquidity, but the SEC is justified in showing concern. Its concern, however, should not fixate on the welfare of the sophisticated signatory
who voluntarily engages in the transaction. Instead, the SEC should
concentrate on the aftermath of the trade, particularly the signatory's
ultimate disposition of those securities. Downstream is where the SEC
should focus its interest, because that is where the public is at risk of
unknowingly purchasing toxic securities. The role of the SEC is not to
regulate the substance of a trade or to prevent bad or risky investments. In this instance, the calculated judgments of sophisticated parties bargaining at arm's length and with ready access to counsel ought
to be left alone.

